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The invasion planning, execution and ongoing reconstruction operations in Iraq are extremely 
complex.  Using research, personal experience and experience of deployed members, this paper 
documents events which led to the current situation in Iraq, discusses lesson learned and offers 
alternative approaches which may decrease time and budget requirements for future 
reconstruction operations. 
 
I have served in the US Armed Forces since 1982.  My service includes four tours of duty in the 
Middle East and I have spent all of my adult life dealing directly or indirectly with Middle East 
politics and terrorisms.  As an Air Force Engineering Officer, I participated directly in the 
planning, execution, recovery and rebuilding operations associated with Operation Iraqi 
Freedom.  I worked as a member of General Frank’s Central Command (CENTCOM) staff, Lt 
Gen McKiernan’s Coalition Force Land Component Command (CFLCC) and Lt General 
Petreaus’s Multi National Security Transition Command (MNSTC-I). As a member of these 
staffs, I was involved with the engineering, maneuver operations planning and execution.  I 
worked closely with other government agencies, Coalition partners and all branches of the US 
military in support of operations in Iraq.   
 
The speed and complexity of the invasion and removal of the Saddam’s government was 
unprecedented in military history.  The reconstruction effort underway in Iraq is larger, more 
dangerous and complex than the reconstruction of Europe after WWII.  (The US government 
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took almost four years after WWII to authorize the European Recovery Act (Marshall Plan) and 
it was nine years before Germany was allowed to reestablish a military) ( Petreaus, 2005).  The 
scope and complexity of the Iraqi reconstruction effort surpasses that of the Marshall Plan and 
will be analyzed by military and civilian members for many years to determine successes and 
failures of the program.   
 
While I actively participated in the planning, execution and recovery phases of the Iraqi 
operation my coworkers and I did not fully understand the events we participated in especially 
the reconstruction process or phase four as defined by CENTCOM planner.  The phase four or 
reconstruction phase has become the longest lasting and most costly phase of the Iraq operation.  
This phase has exceeded three years, cost 1700+ US servicemen lives and over 14,000 casualties.  
No one knows when this phase will be complete, how much it will cost in terms of lives and 
dollars or what the final outcome will be.   
 
This thesis seeks to understand the events that led to the current situation in Iraq by researching 
the planning and execution of phase four operations by the Coalition military, Coalition and non-
Coalition governments, the US State Department, Non Government Agencies and the United 
Nations.  The research is based on unclassified data provided by law to Congress, books, notes 
and articles published by various agencies and individuals involved in the recovery operations 
and through my personnel experience and observation over the past four years.   This thesis will 
document the planning process and execution of phase four operations.  It will explore 
alternative approaches to the planning and execution of recovery operations in Iraq based on 
lessons learned.  The goal of this research is to better understand the events that lead to current 
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conditions in Iraq and explore recovery methods, which if used may have resulted in more 
successful operations, less loss of life and a quicker end to direct US involvement in Iraq.  Due to 
the complexity of the Iraqi operations, I recognize this thesis is only a small glimpse into the 
events associated with these operations; however, through initial research I hope to stimulate 
additional interest in exploring the history and ongoing operations associated with the planning, 
execution and recovery operations in Iraq.  My goal is this thesis and other research will educate 
civilian, military and engineering planners and allow them to understand the long-term 
implication of their plans and actions.  I also hope to stimulate thought about alternative means 
to meet our countries objective through deliberate and thoughtful planning and appropriate 
investment of time, money and our countries human resources.  
 
 




The country of Iraq was formed in 1920 by a mandate from the League of Nations to the United 
Kingdom.  Since its formation, Iraq has been ruled first by the UK, second by an Iraqi king 
installed by the UK and then by a series of military leaders who assumed powered through 
military coups.  The last coups in 1968 lead to the Baath party rule and in 1979 the installation of 
Saddam Hussein as “President” of Iraq.  Saddam's brutal leadership lasted until his ouster in 
2003 by coalition forces.  Saddam’s rule was marked by a deadly 8-year war with Iran where 
over 1 million Iraqi and Iranian citizens were killed, an invasion of Kuwait, two wars with 
Coalition forces and a 12-year UN embargo.  During Saddam’s 24-year rule, he and the Baath 
party striped Iraq resources to create the world’s fourth largest military, and enrich themselves.   
After the invasion of Iraq by Coalition forces in 2003, the Coalition slowly discovered the extent 
of Saddam’s neglect of the Iraqi civil infrastructure.  The failure by Coalition forces to recognize 
and plan for the extent of decay and destruction of Iraq’s vital infrastructure before, during and 
after the war has damaged the US’s reputation and has delayed efforts to reestablish Iraq as an 
independent and self sustaining country.  This thesis looks at the history of reconstruction 
planning prior to the war, reconstruction efforts over the last three years and the direction of 
future reconstruction efforts.  The thesis explores the history of Iraq and pre war planning, post 
war decisions, which impacted the reconstruction process in Iraq.  This paper looks at the failure 
of leaders to properly identify and plan for pre and post war conditions in Iraq and the impact of 
planning failures on the reconstruction operations in Iraq.  This paper will outline the impact and 
critical requirement to complete reconstruction in Iraq and explore currents reconstruction 
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methods, which are being utilized to more efficiently complete reconstruction efforts.  The 
purpose of this thesis is to conduct initial research into pre and post invasion planning, analyze 
impact of the reconstruction planning and the decision making process and explore alternative 
approaches to reconstruction which may meet our countries goals with less capital and human 
resources.  The research objectives of this thesis are to provide an initial data source for other 
researchers, stimulate thought and additional research into reconstruction planning and 
execution, explore alternative approaches to planning and execution of reconstruction projects 
and to provide a basis to understand our mistakes and avoid repeating them in future operations.  
The original contribution of this thesis is a comprehensive analysis of the entire Iraq operation 
and its impact on reconstruction in Iraq.  The thesis looks at war planning and execution, pre-war 
reconstruction planning, political decision processes, reconstruction funding, contracting 
methods, critical decisions, successes and failures of the reconstruction phase.  The research 
methods included data collection in 2005 and 2006, interviews with military and civilian 
planners who were responsible for reconstruction planning and my personal observations of 
events that occurred with the reconstruction effort.  My hope is that through research and 
analysis of pre and post war events we can educate civilian, military and engineering planners so 
they will understand the long term implication of their plans and they will require detailed 
planning and precise execution of all phases of a future operation.                 
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Chapter 2 
BRIEF OVERVIEW OF IRAQ’S HISTORY AND GEOGRAPHY 
 
I.  Brief Overview of Iraq’s History:   
The region, which is called Iraq today, was once know as Mesopotamia and was the home to one 
of the world’s earliest civilizations.  This region between the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers was 
recognized as the birthplace of civilization and flourished for thousands of years.  In 1920, the 
United Kingdom was awarded a mandate, which established the country of Iraq and in 1921 the 
British installed the first king of Iraq.  In 1932 Iraq declared itself an independent country and 
since then has seen a succession of leaders who acquired and held power through military force.   
 
II.  Overview of Iraq’s Geography:   
While the climate and topography has changed considerable since early times, the country of 
Iraq is still blessed with a tremendous amount of natural and geographical resources.  Iraq has 
the second largest known reserve of oil and one of the largest reserves of natural gas in the 
world.  For a Middle-Eastern country, Iraq is blessed with a tremendous amount of water.  It is 
fed by the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, which supply several large lakes and wetlands throughout 
the country.  (Figure 1 shows the Tigris River flowing thru Baghdad)  The Northeastern section 
of the country has mountains, which are subject to nine feet of snow a year, while the western 
and southern regions are barren desert, which see less than 10 inches of rainfall a year (Figure 2 
shows a snow feed lake in Northeast Iraq).   
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Figure 1 
Tigris River flowing thru Baghdad 
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Iraq’s natural water resources combined with its’ fertile soil is more than capable of meeting the 
countries food requirements.  (Figures 3 thru 8 shows Iraq’s agriculture and national irrigation 
systems)  However, Iraq’s history of political instability, war and rule by brutal dictators has left 
the country broke and desolate.  Saddam Hussein and the Baath party drained a significant 
amount of the country’s wealth and squandered its natural resources.  The Iraq invasion by 
Coalition members resulted in the Coalition assuming responsibility for rebuilding Iraq’s 
infrastructure.  Through reconstruction the Coalition hopes to establish Iraq once again as a 
major economic, political and cultural center in the Middle East. 
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Figure 4 
Agriculture:  North Central Iraq 
 










































Agriculture:  Northwest Iraq
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Figure 7 
Agriculture:  Northeast Iraq
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Figure 8  
Irrigation and Agriculture 
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Chapter 3 
OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM PLANNING 
 
I.  JOINT OPERATIONS PLANNING   
I.A.  Joint Staffs 
In 1986 Congress passed the Goldwater- Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act 
which established seven regional joint commands (Franks, 2004).  Each regional command is 
lead by a four star general traditionally called the CINC (Commander in Chief) for their Area 
of Responsibility (AOR).  This term was recently changed to COCOM (Combatant 
Commander) to avoid the Commander in Chief terminology.  These commands are staffed 
with active duty, reserve and National Guard members from all the services.  The staffs are 
tasked with planning and executing all military operations within their region or Area of 
Responsibility.  During peacetime the staffs coordinate with military and political leaders to 
establish relationships and concepts for future operations.  During peacetime the COCOMs 
do not have any forces; however, during periods of war, each service provides troops and 
staff to the COCOM to execute his mission within his AOR.  During war, the COCOM 
becomes the commander of all forces within their AOR, and the COCOM is directly 
supported by component command from each service.  EX:  CENTCOM’s component 
commands are ARCENT (Army Central Command), NAVCENT (Navy Central Command), 
CENTAF (Air Force Central Command), MARCENT (Marine Central Command) and 
SOCCENT  (Special Operations Command).   
The COCOM joint staffs are generally composed of the following sections:   
J1:  Responsible for all personnel issues 
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J2:  Responsible for intelligence planning and operations     
  J3:  Responsible for all operations execution 
J4:  Responsible for all logistics planning, operations and execution 
J5:  Responsible for developing, updating and maintaining all required plans 
J6:  Responsible for communications  
J7:  Responsible for engineering planning and execution 
 
I. B. Engineering 
Engineering on a joint staff may fall under the Logistics Director (J4) or they may be a 
standalone directorate.  At the component level, engineering is almost always a standalone 
directorate and is designated as the J7, C7 or A7.  Engineers work closely with the J3, J4 and 
J5 directorates prior to and during combat operations; however, after active combat 
operations are complete, major reconstruction and repair operations may be conducted under 
the joint staff or as in Iraq under a separate engineering command along with a joint 
command engineering force.  
   
II.  UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND   
II.A.  Operation Iraqi Freedom Planning 
Planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom began in late 2001 (Franks, 2004).  CENTCOM’s staff was 
tasked with developing a plan that would secure regime change and weapons of mass destruction 
removal.  This plan evolved multiple times over the proceeding 15 months; however, the plan 
originated with and maintained four distinct phases.  The first phase was the preparation phase.  In 
this phase, troop movement would be planned, overseas basing would be negotiated and secured and 
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an “Air Bridge” would be established to move personnel and equipment (Franks, 2004).  Phase two 
was “shaping of the battle space” by pre-positioning troops and equipment in theater and starting 
initial combat operations primarily air operations.  Phase three was “Decisive Operations” which 
included full-scale military operations to ensure the “regime forces are defeated or capitulated and 
regime leaders are dead, apprehended or marginalized”.  Phase four operation would be “Post 
Hostility Operations” and while the timeline for this was unknown, earlier planners assumed this 
phase would extend for several years (Franks, 2004). 
 
II. B.  Phase Four 
As originally envisioned phase four operations would end with the “establishment of a representative 
form of government in a country capable of defending its territorial borders and maintaining internal 
security, without any weapons of mass destruction”.    CENTCOM planners understood that phase 
four operations would be complex and would rely on noncombatant, nontraditional military units 
such as Civil Affairs.  Additionally, they recognized this phase would require heavy involvement by 
agencies outside of the Department of Defense, Experienced political and military personnel from 
the US and other coalition partners.  The planning staff realized Non Governmental Organizations 
support for Humanitarian Operations would be critical to ensuring success of this phase (Franks, 
2004).  
Initial planning envisioned that troop levels would continue to rise during phase four operations.  
General Franks thought that troop levels up to 250,000 might be required to ensure a successful 
phase four operation (Franks, 2004).  The Army Chief of Staff, General Shinseki, said he thought 
numbers approaching 500,000 troops might be required for phase four operations.  (General Shinseki 
was harshly criticized for this statement and may have been pressured to retire early because of his 
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views on phase four operations and other issues within the Department of Defense).  These 
commanders recognized that establishing security and order would require a significant force and 
was critical to ensuring a successful operation.  Failure to listen to these and other senior military 
leaders on required troop strengths and complexity of required actions for a successful phase four 
operations is unfortunate.  The Coalition's inability to stabilize Iraq and complete reconstruction 
efforts after three years may be directly linked to failure to plan and execute a successful phase four 
operations.     Phase four planners understood that a new Iraqi Army would have to be reestablished 
from units within the existing Iraqi Army.  This Iraqi Army would have to provide security within 
the country, ensure religious extremist and ethnic violence was not allowed to be established and to 
provide security throughout Iraq for Coalition military and civilian reconstruction teams.   
 
II. C.  Economy 
Iraq’s economy was almost completely a state-run economy with oil providing 95% of the 
government’s income.    Due to mismanagement of the economy by Iraq’s incompetent leaders, the 
Gross Domestic Product per capita had dropped from a high of $2500 in 1979 to less than a $1000 in 
2002 prior to the invasion (2207, Jan 04).  Military planners recognized a massive jobs program 
would have to be initiated quickly after liberating Iraq.  Finding meaningful work for the Iraqi 
people would allow them to have an adequate income, raise their standard of living and allow them 
to see hope for the future was a critical component of phase four operations.   Planners anticipated 
that postwar Iraqi’s hope for a better future and belief in the coalition's ability to support them would 
allow for improved security conditions within the country and enable additional international 
investment in Iraq creating more jobs and prosperity. 
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III.  OFFICE OF RECONSTRUCTION AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE   
III.A.  ORHA Concept 
As part of the phase four planning, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld established the Office 
of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA).  This office worked under General 
Franks at CENTCOM and reported directly to Secretary Rumsfeld.  On Jan 1, 2003, Secretary 
Rumsfeld appointed retired Army Lt. General Jay Garner as the head of ORHA (Bremer 2006).  
General Garner played a key role in providing humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi Kurds in 
Northern Iraq immediately after the first Gulf war.  Garner was viewed as a critical component to 
ensure the success of phase four operations.  ORHA was staffed from a variety of government 
agencies.  Members from the State Department, Department of Defense, and other government 
agencies were loaned to ORHA; however, ORHA did not have a budget and had a very limited 
and inexperienced staffed.   General Garner lobbied US government agencies hard for support 
prior to the war and received a lot of promises from various agencies; however, prior to the war 
his organization was not well supported because agency heads did not know if the war would 
take place or if ORHA’s services would be even be required.  Without a defined mission, most 
government administrators were reluctant to support ORHA with personnel or the required funds 
to successfully execute a reconstruction mission (Franks, 2004).   
 
III.B.  ORHA Implementation 
General Garner and the ORHA staff spent many hours prior to the invasion working with 
CENTCOM and other military planning staff to map out a reconstruction plan (Franks, 2004).   
The principles of the reconstruction plan were to: 
1. “Secure massive funding for the immediate needs of the Iraqi people” 
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2.  “Hire tens of thousands of the former Iraqi soldiers to ensure they had money to take care 
of their families” 
3.“Identify political leaders who could be trusted by the Iraqi, and capable of assisting and 
ultimately replacing an occupying military force.” 
4.  “Implement a de-Baathification policy that wasn’t so cumbersome that it essentially 
disenfranchised Iraq’s educated middle class.”       
According to General Franks, the key to a successful phase four operation was “achieving 
security and implementing civic action” (Franks, 2004).   
 
III. C.  Operations 
In early 2003, General Garner moved the ORHA staff to Kuwait to pre-stage for the evasion.   
However, due to the difficulties he experienced in Washington attempting to secure funding and 
personnel, his staff in Kuwait was grossly understaffed and under funded.  Immediately prior to 
the invasion he had less than 200 staff members and no where near the financial resources he 
required (Franks, 2004). 
In April 2003 after major combat operations were over, CENTCOM’s senior staff recognized the 
difficult position ORHA was in.  The staff understood the anticipated humanitarian crisis likely 
would not occur; however, the collapse of Iraq’s military and police force combined with the 
decayed infrastructure found throughout Iraq may lead to conditions of poor security and impede 
civil action.   
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IV.  COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY 
IV.A. CPA Establishment 
On 9 May, 2003 President Bush appointed L. Paul Jerry Bremer III, as the Presidential 
Envoy to Iraq.  As the Presidents Envoy, Ambassador Bremer was given “full authority over 
all US Government personnel, activities and funds” (Bremer, 2006).  Immediately after this 
Secretary Rumsfeld appointed Ambassador Bremer as the head of the Coalition Provisional 
Authority and “empowered him with all executive, legislative and judicial functions in Iraq” 
(Bremer, 2006).  As the head of the CPA and Ambassador to Iraq, Bremer worked with the 
Secretary of Defense directly under the President of the United States.  (Ambassador Bremer 
was not given authority over the Coalition military members in Iraq.  The military in Iraq 
remained under CENTCOM’s control and worked with the Ambassador and CPA.)  This 
action replaced General Garner as the head of the reconstruction effort and established a new 
organization to run Iraq and the reconstruction three weeks after the end of combat 
operations.   
 
IV.B.  CPA Implementation 
The announcement of the CPA and Ambassador Bremer was presented politically as an 
adjustment necessary to increase visibility of Iraq’s issues, raise reconstruction funds and 
international support.   The official line was ORHA was only a temporary organization and 
they had accomplished the task they were created for (Bremer, 2006).  The effects of the 
change three weeks into the operation had a significant impact.  The press indicated that 
ORHA was being replaced due to failure on their part and General Garner was subject to a 
significant amount speculation on why he was being replaced.  Ambassador Bremer's opinion 
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was the position required someone with more diplomatic experience verses military 
experience.  Regardless of why the decision was made, the timing of replacing ORHA and 
General Garner with a new staff and command structure within weeks of their arrival left 
many of the staff confused and set the reconstruction effort in Iraq back.  General Garner and 
part of his staff stayed in Iraq for the transition then returned home.  The remaining ORHA’s 
staff stayed in Iraq and transitioned into the CPA organization.  ORHA still exists as a small 
entirety under the CPA today. 
         
IV. C.  Personal Observation of ORHA 
I was not aware ORHA existed until February 2003 when their single engineer contacted me 
for assistance on an engineering issue.  The limited staff had been based out of the Kuwait 
Hilton in Kuwait City since January; however, they had very limited interaction with the 
maneuver forces before and during the war.  Their hotel was less than 20 miles from the 
Land Component Commanders HQ; however, there was very little interaction between the 
agency responsible for executing the war and the agency responsible for feeding clothing and 
rebuilding Iraq after the war.   This self-imposed separation should have been an early 
indication of the reconstruction difficulties that would follow.   
ORHA’s failure to communicate with the agency responsible for providing security and civic 
action assisting Iraq after the war further compounded efforts to rebuild Iraq.  Additionally, 
the limited engineering staff assigned to ORHA and lack of proper funding greatly limited 
ORHA’s ability to access engineering requirements and execute repairs (Franks, 2004).   
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V.  UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
V.A.  USAID Funding 
In 2002, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) began planning for 
the anticipated humanitarian crises in Iraq after the invasion.  USAID issued grants of $60 
million for logistics support and $400 million in cash and food to the United Nations World Food 
Program (2207, Jan 2003). The USAID and the UN World Food Program (WFP) staffs 
anticipated having to provide basic food supplies to many of Iraq’s 25 million people and they 
believed post war Iraq would be the largest humanitarian relief project in WFP history (USAID, 
2004).   
  
V. B.  USAID Staffing 
USAID established a 60 person Damage Assistance response teams composed of members from 
the USAID Asia/Near east division to coordinate immediate reconstruction priorities, actions and 
work with USAID personnel who would be handling long-term reconstruction action in Iraq. 
When the Humanitarian crises failed to emerge in Iraq, USAID staff continued to operate in Iraq 
identifying and executing reconstruction projects.  They continue to operate today in Iraq as an 
organization independent of the CPA and the military. 
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Chapter 4  
PHASE THREE MILITARY ENGINEERING PLANNING 
 
I.  Phase Three Planning 
A significant amount of engineering planning went into preparing the battlefield and support of 
maneuver forces for the Iraqi invasion.  Prior to the war, Iraq possessed a 400,000 man military 
and had air and missile assets, which were capable of delivering conventional, chemical and 
biological weapons throughout the region.  Additionally, the Iraqi forces had a tremendous 
advantage in that they would be fighting in their country, land they knew and controlled.  From a 
maneuver forces perspective, the ability of the Iraqi Army to control the fight by controlling the 
terrain and routes of travel presented tremendous challenges to coalition maneuver forces and 
engineers.   Through denial of roads, bridges, airfields and strategic placement of minefields, the 
Iraqi Army had the ability to greatly limit Coalition maneuver forces routes of travel, inflict 
additional casualties and cause significant delays in reaching Baghdad and other centers of 
power.  In addition, the Iraqi Army had the ability to destroy strategic dams and open irrigation 
networks throughout the country flooding maneuver routes and causing a significant 
humanitarian crisis.  To cope with these possibilities, detailed invasion planning and asset 
positioning was conducted by the Coalition engineering staff.  Most of the planning centered on 
ensuring desired maneuver routes remained opened given a variety of Iraqi denial techniques.  
Bridging, mine clearing, airfield repair and maneuver force protection were the main focus of 
military engineering planners prior to the war.   
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II.  Phase Three Movement 
The movement of maneuver forces personnel and equipment presented significant challenges to 
logistic and engineering staff planners.  Before military and civilian members could be moved to 
the theater, staff engineers had to identify locations for base camps, get host nation approval, 
construct camps and construct training and equipment storage areas.  Logistic planners had to 
arrange air, sea and land transportation to move units half way across the world.  Additionally, 
they had to feed, equip and support 290,000 Coalition personnel for months prior to the invasion. 
To counter the numerous Iraqi denial techniques, a significant number of engineering assets and 
personnel were mobilized and moved forward to Kuwait.  Some of these assets were available 
from active duty forces; however, many of these assets were in the Guard and Reserve forces and 
had to be mobilized.  To ensure the engineering units were available in time, engineering and 
logistics planners were forced to identify required engineering assets six months to a year prior 
to the invasion.  These units underwent a complex mobilization process which includes 
additional training, certification and movement of equipment and personnel.  The movement of 
these engineering personnel and equipment involved mobilization.  Timing of the engineering 
unit’s movement into theater was critical also as the units and their equipment had to arrive in 
theater in time to train and preposition.  The engineer’s mobilization and deployment process 
went on for many months and played a significant role in the success of the maneuver forces in 
seizure and control of critical infrastructure in Iraq.   
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Chapter 5  
PHASE FOUR MILITARY ENGINEERING PLANNING 
 
I. Phase Four Planning 
 In contrast to the extensive planning that went into supporting maneuver forces, little planning 
was conducted to determine infrastructure repair that would be required after the war.  Iraq was 
assumed to be a modern Middle Eastern country and compared to Afghanistan 18th century 
infrastructure; Iraq’s infrastructure appeared to be in very good condition.  Iraq possessed a 
significant civil infrastructure that included an extensive road network, power production, power 
distribution, water supply, water distribution, sanitation and airports.  Engineering planners 
assumed this infrastructure would be in good working order after the war and did not plan for nor 
were they tasked with a massive engineering reconstruction effort. 
Before and during combat operations, a significant amount of planning and discussion went into 
target selections in Iraq.  The Coalition recognized destroying Iraq’s civil infrastructure had little 
military value and would be a large liability, which we would have to address after the invasion.  
Other than targeting the communication network, Coalition forces attacked very little civil 
infrastructure in Iraq and only when it was required to directly support maneuver forces.   
Little pre-invasion phase four military engineering planning was accomplished.  Military 
planners looked at the significant amount of existing civil infrastructure, its perceived condition, 
and the limited civil infrastructure damage required to execute the invasion and assumed they 
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would not be responsible for a large scale rebuilding effort.  Consequently, little was done on the 
military engineering side to address and prepare for a large-scale reconstruction effort after the 
war.   
II.  Oil Planning 
The exception to lack of pre-invasion reconstruction planning was the planning associated with 
repair of the oil and gas wells.  Based on Iraq’s actions at the end of the first Gulf War, Coalition 
forces fully anticipated Saddam Hussein would order his forces to torch the oil fields in southern 
Iraq and possibly in Northern Iraq.  The Coalition recognized the revenue from these oil wells 
were the key to stabilizing Iraq and establishing a viable and independent country.  (Iraq oil 
revenue under the UN food for oil program was $50M/day) (USAID, 2004).  In addition to the 
requirement to maintain the oil revenue, the Coalition wanted to avoid the environmental impact 
Saddam created after the first Gulf War by simultaneously burning many of the oil wells in 
Kuwait as his forces withdrew.  To combat the anticipated destruction of Iraq’s oil wells, the 
Coalition formed an engineering group to analyze methods to quickly extinguish the oil well 
fires, limit the environmental impact of the well destruction and restore the wellheads to 
operations as soon as possible.  Boots and Coots firefighters were pre-staged in Kuwait and they 
extinguished the nine oil well fires within days of Coalition forces seizing the Rumilyah oil 
fields in southern Iraq.  The majority of the oil wells were not torched and while the oil 
engineering team was used initially, they did not have to deal with anywhere near the destruction 
that was anticipated.  The Iraqi had positioned explosives on the wells and pipelines; however, 
Marine and Special Operations Forces defused the vast majority of these (Franks, 2004).  The 
speed of the Marine and SOF forces movement into the southern oil fields likely surprised the 
Iraq military and they may not have had time to respond.  Saddam may have intended to or 
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actually given the order to torch the oil wells; however, the Coalition’s effort to block 
communications within the Iraqi chain of command through convincing Iraqi leaders not to 
follow Saddam's orders to torch the wells may have avoided a significant environmental and 
economic catastrophe.  
 27  
Chapter 6  
IRAQ INVASION 
  
I.  Invasion 
On 19 March 2003, Special Operations forces began the initial offensive operation in Iraq.  
Hours later on 20 March 2003 (G-Day), Ground operation began with 170,000 Coalition 
maneuver forces beginning movement into Iraq.  Less than 24 hours after ground forces 
began initial movement, major air operations started on 21 Mar 2003 (A-Day).  Between 20 
March and the President’s announcement of the end of offensive operations on 1 May 2003 
Coalition force traversed almost 300 miles of enemy territory and executed the fastest and 
most complicated movement in military history (Franks, 2004).  Two and a half weeks after 
crossing the Kuwait border, V Corps and the 1 MEF units entered Baghdad.  
 
II. Infrastructure Condition 
The Coalition’s first indication of the desperate condition of Iraq’s infrastructure came during 
the early days of the war.  Immediately after the maneuver forces pushed through, we 
(Coalition Engineers) traveled throughout the Southern Oil Fields surveying the oil 
infrastructure and analyzing required repairs to reestablish oil production.  While there was 
little environmental impact from the small number of oil well fires, the fires had been quickly 
extinguished, we found significant amounts of oil pooled on the desert surface along the 
pipelines and at the wells.  We determined this pooling was a result of leaking pipes, decayed 
infrastructure and appeared to have occurred over many years.  We were not surprised the 
environmental impact of oil spills from poorly maintained infrastructure appeared to be of 
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little concern to the Iraqi government; however, we were amazed at the lack of basic 
maintenance and repair on the oil systems.  These systems were the life of the Iraqi economy 
and produced 95% of Iraq income.   As westerners, we expected the system to be in prime 
condition, aggressively managed and designed with built-in redundancy.  What we found was 
a system that was almost completely broken by western standards.   
We later discovered that the failure to maintain the oil infrastructure was typical of the entire 
country’s infrastructure maintenance.  Over time we discovered that the Iraqi maintenance 
standards were even lower for the rest of their civil infrastructure.  What appeared to be 
viable infrastructure systems prior to the war were in fact in various states of collapse.  
Water, sewer, electrical, roads and other infrastructure had been neglected for so long many 
did not work and what worked only did so based on Iraqi ingenuity.  Our failure to recognize 
and plan for this before the war contributed significantly to the ongoing instability in Iraq. 
Over time, we discovered the poor design, lack of construction standards and poor quality of 
installed equipment further compounded the issue with Iraq’s infrastructure.   
 
III. Infrastructure Assessment 
Prior to the war, Iraq appeared to be a modern Middle Eastern country.  What neither our 
intelligence organization nor we understood was the country under Saddam’s rule had done 
little to maintain its’ infrastructure.  Many of my coworkers and I had worked as engineers in 
the Middle East before and we were familiar with the Arab culture.  We recognized that in 
the Middle East, technically challenging infrastructure was almost entirely operated and 
maintained by western companies.  We assumed Iraq would be no different.  Typically in 
Middle Eastern countries, western companies install modern, expensive equipment and keep 
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a well trained and highly paid maintenance staff on hand to ensure its operation.  This had 
not occurred under Saddam rule.  Much of the equipment and infrastructure was poor quality 
when installed and the Iraqi’s appeared to have no concept of maintenance required to keep 
equipment operational.    
What we found was that while Iraq had a large amount infrastructure, the lack of basic 
maintenance and skilled labor render significant portions of their infrastructure useless.   
(Figure 9 shows the collapse of Iraq’s sewer infrastructure)  Over time we came to 
understand Saddam Hussein used the country’s vast resources as a means of building up his 
army, engaging in war, enriching himself, his family and the Baath Party.     
 





Collapse of the Sewer Infrastructure in Baghdad 
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IV.  Looting 
Compounding the prewar issue with Iraq’s infrastructure, we were faced with an 
unbelievable amount of looting. We watched while the looting went on; however, we did not 
have troops in country to stop it nor did we understand the significance of the problem.  What 
we saw were individuals stealing furniture, appliances, commercial goods, etc from a 
repressive government and we understood these as acts against an Iraqi government that had 
brutally repressed its people for thirty years.  What we did not see and understand was they 
were destroying the country’s vital infrastructure.  The government owned almost all civil 
and industrial infrastructures in Iraq.  The looting that occurred to Iraq’s infrastructure went 
well beyond stealing furniture and appliances.  The poverty of the Iraqi people before the war 
and resulting economic shut down after the war left many citizens with few options for 
survival.  This poverty resulted in its citizens taking anything of value from the government-
controlled infrastructure.  In commercial facilities, they removed wiring, plumbing, fixtures, 
tiles, blocks, bricks and almost anything that could be removed from unoccupied facilities.  
In industrial facilities, they stole pipelines, generators, power lines, and other critical 
infrastructure items along with any stock piled material.  This looting resulted in the stripping 
and gutting of almost all government facilities and the country’s supporting infrastructure. 
 
To compound the looting, squatters moved into the abandoned government facilities.  Over 
the next two years these squatters trashed the facilities and compounds.  They continued to 
strip the facilities and basically destroy whatever remaining infrastructure remained.  
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Between looting and the squatters, many of the Iraqi Government’s facilities were destroyed 
and rendered completely uninhabitable.   
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Chapter 7 
COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY 
 
I.  CPA Establishment 
In early May 2004, the President created the Coalition Provisional Authority and appointed 
Ambassador Bremer as Administrator of the CPA and as the President’s special envoy.    The 
duties of the CPA administrator and the military commanders were defined as: 
“The administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) reports to the President through 
the Secretary of Defense.  He oversees, directs and coordinates all U.S. Government (USG) 
programs and activities in Iraq, except those under the command of the Commander, U.S. 
Central Command (CENTCOM)” (Bremer, 2006). 
 The duties tasked to the CPA were defined as:  “The CPA exercises power of government 
temporarily in order to provide the effective administration of Iraq, to restore conditions of 
security, and stability, to create conditions in which the Iraqi people can freely determine their 
own political future, (including by advancing efforts to restore and establish national and local 
institutions for representative government) and facilitating economic recovery, sustainable 
reconstruction and development” (Bremer, 2006). 
The authority of the CPA was defined as:  “The CPA is vested by the President with all 
executive, legislative and judicial authority necessary to achieve its objectives, exercised 
consistent with relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions, including resolution 1483, and laws 
and usage of war.  The CPA administrator has primary responsibility for exercising this 
authority” (2207, Jun 2003).    
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II.  CPA Administrator 
As director of CPA, Ambassador Bremer was given full authority over all U.S. Government 
personnel in Iraq excluding those under the CENTCOM Commander.   He oversaw all personnel 
from the Department of State, Justice, Treasury and other executive branch staffs operating in 
Iraq.   Ambassador Bremer controlled all non-CENTCOM personnel entering and exiting Iraq, 
their funding and agency staffing in Iraq.   As of late May 2003, Ambassador Bremer controlled 
a staff 695 personnel in Iraq.  This staff includes USAID Disaster Assistance Response Teams 
(DART) and the remaining ORHA staff.  (Bremer, 2006) (Table 1 shows the Coalition’s Chain 
of Command.  Table 2 shows the CPA’s organizational structure.)  
 
III.  Coalition Forces 
The Commander of Coalition Forces was tasked to “directly support the CPA by deterring 
hostilities, maintain Iraq’s territorial integrity and security, searching for securing and destroying 
weapons of mass destruction and assisting in carrying out Coalition policy” (2207, Jun 2003).  
After the end of offences operations, CENTCOM established Combined Joint Task Force – 7 as 
the command structure in Iraq.  CFTF-7’s commander reported directly to the CENTCOM 
Commander under the Sectary of Defense.  In May, 2003 CJTF-7’s Commander had 147,500 US 
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Table 1 Coalition’s Chain of Command 
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Table 2 Coalition Provisional Authority Structure 
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IV.  Coalition Engineers 
During the war, engineers from various engineering groups in theater were pieced together to 
support Combined Joint Task Force–7 as it took over command of all military forces in Iraq after 
the end of combat operations.  As the primary component in Iraq, the Army provided the 
majority of staffing for CJTF-7.  This engineering group was composed primary of Army 
Combat Engineers from the theater commands.  The CJTF J7 was a small group of engineers 
who had very little time to define its engineering mission or acquire resources before it was sent 
forward to Baghdad to become CJTF J7.  Once in Baghdad, the engineer’s primary focus was to 
support coalition forces engineering requirements along with the emerging repair of the Iraqi 
infrastructure.  However, the majority of Combat Engineers are not degreed engineers and had 
little training or experience in major infrastructure repairs.  (Army Combat Engineers are 
primarily trained to support maneuver forces with expedient bridging, mine clearing, terrain 
manipulation and other elements required to ensure successful maneuver operations.)    
When CJTF J7 was formed, none of us envisioned that they would lead a major reconstruction 
effort.  While senior leaders very much understood that Iraq’s oil, water, sewer and electric 
infrastructure were critical to ensuring Iraq would recovery from the wars and Saddam’s rule 
when they formed CJTF J7 no one understood the amount of engineering effort required to 
rebuild Iraq’s critical infrastructure.  
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Chapter 8  
RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING SOURCES 
 
I.  Funds Administrator 
As director of the CPA, Ambassador Bremer was responsible for controlling all reconstruction 
funds in Iraq, setting program priorities and monitoring the progress of reconstruction efforts in 
Iraq.  (The exclusion to this was the funds and tasked assigned to the CENTCOM commander in 
execution of his mission.) 
 
II.  Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund I (IRRF I)  
On 12 April 2003, the US Congress authorized the first U.S. Government funding for 
reconstruction in Iraq.  These funds were based on pre war estimates of infrastructure repair and 
priorities for conducting those repairs.  Congress authorized $2.475 billion dollars toward 
reconstruction efforts in Iraq.  $1.52 Billion of these funds were given to USAID and the Corps 
of Engineers, Gulf Region Division for repair of the electrical systems in Iraq.  IRRF I funds 
were also allocated toward capital improvement projects for water and sewer systems, 
healthcare, education, transportation rule of law and governance.  In recognition of the 
complexity of determining reconstruction requirements and priorities, Congress authorized the 
CPA to spend the money as necessary for the reconstruction of Iraq; however, Congress required 
CPA thru the office of Management and Budget to report to Congress every quarter on the status 
of the funds spent and planned allocation of the remaining funds. 
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III.  Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund II (IRRF II)  
Congress authorized and President Bush signed into law the Emergency Appropriation Act for 
defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan FY 2004 on 6 Nov, 2003.  As part of 
this law, Congress authorized $18.649 Billion dollars toward the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction 
fund.  This fund became know as IRRF II. 
 
IV.  Development Funds for Iraq (DFI) 
DFI are a United Nations (UN) fund authorized under UNSCR 1483.  These funds are generated 
primary from the UN “Oil for Food”.  In UNSCR 1483, The UN specified “The funds are to be 
used for the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people, for economic reconstruction and repair of 
Iraq’s infrastructure, for continued disarmament of Iraq, for the cost of Iraq’s administration, and 
for other purposes benefiting the people of Iraq” (2207, Jun 2003).  An initial deposit of $1 
Billion was made into this account and the UN authorized the CPA to direct disbursement of the 
funds.   
 
V.  Iraqi State Assets 
President Bush authorized Iraqi assets that were frozen or confiscated by the US government 
were to be used “For the benefit of the Iraqi people and their nation’s recovery.”  These assets 
included $1.7 Billion in US controlled assets, $1Billion in assets that came under US control 
during the invasion (Gold and cash seized by US forces during the invasion) and $200 Million in 
Iraqi assets dating back to 1992 (2207, June 2003).  (Table 3 shows non-DOD managed Iraqi 
funds)  (Table 4 shows DOD managed Iraqi funds) 
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VI.  International Donors 
On 23-24 October, 2003 the first international donor’s conference was held in Madrid.  
Conference attendees pledged $13 billion in support for Iraq; however, these pledges have not 
materialized as promised.  (Approximately $1 Billion of the $13 Billion pledged has been 
provided.)  (Table 5 is a summary table by donor)   
 
VII.  Department of Defense Funds Authorized for Iraq’s Reconstruction 
In 2003 Congress authorized the DOD to spend up to $489M in DOD funds to repair 
infrastructure in Iraq.  In the FY 2005 the DOD supplemental appropriations provided $5.3 
Billion for the training and equipping of Iraqi Security forces and $320 in Commander 
Emergency Relief Funds. 
Commander Emergency Relief Funds are DOD budgeted funds which are spent  
 
by local commanders to meet the immediate reconstruction needs in his area of responsibility.   
 
As of Oct 2005, $718 million in total CEPR funds had been spent.  (2207, June 2003)   
 
VIII.  Iraq Funds Generated by the Iraqi Government  
 These funds are primary generated from the sale of oil and average $15 billion/year.  The spike 
in world oil prices increased Iraq oil revenue to $25-30 billion in 2005 and 2006.   (Iraq’s annual 
budget was approximately $15 Billion prior to the spike in oil prices.)   
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Table 3  Non - DOD Iraq Resources 
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Table 4 
June 03 Iraq Obligated Funds 
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Table 5 International Donors Conference 








I.  Funding Allocation 
Congress allocated IRRF funds to be spent in ten categories or sectors.  Congress also directed 
these funds to be track by the CPA by sectors and required the Director of Management and 
Budget along with the CPA to provide quarterly reports to Congress on spending allocation and 
reconstruction progress.   While Congress allocated the funds by sectors, they authorized the 
CPA to reallocate funds as needed to meet Iraq reconstruction needs.  Congress granted CPA the 
authority to move funds between sectors as needed; however, OMB and CPA are required to 
notify Congress quarterly when and why the funds are reallocated. 
   
II. Sectors Funding 
The Iraq Reconstruction sectors are Security and Law Enforcement, Justice and Public Safety, 
Electric, Oil Infrastructure, Water Resources and Sanitation, Transportation and Telecomm, 
Road, Bridges and Construction, Health Care, Private sector Development, Education, refugees 
and Human Right.  (Figure 10 shows Iraq’s provinces, local government structures within which 
the reconstruction sectors worked.)  Table 6 shows OMB and CPA’s initial 2004 budget for 
IRRF 1 and IRRF II funding.  This table shows the initial funds allocation by sector and the 
estimated quarter when the funds will be allocated.  The initial budget for these sectors is shown 
in Table 6.  Detailed 2004 budget for IRRF funding are shown in the Appendix and detailed 
2006 budget for  IRRF funding are shown in Tables 11-13.   
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Figure 10  
Iraq Provinces 
2207 Report to Congress 
Jan 2004 
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Table 6  
IRRF I and IRRF II Initial Funding by Sector 
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The following are the spending priority for the IRRF funds.  These priorities are based on the 
five principles of CPA’ strategic plan (2207, Jan 2004) 
A.  Security:  “To defeat terrorist and the Baathist and to provide a secure environment 
that enables Iraqi citizens to participate fully in political and economic life.” 
B.  Essential Services:  “To provide essential services and infrastructure especially 
electricity, water and health care at an acceptable standard accessible by all citizens.” 
C.  Economy:  “To provide financial market structure, as well as fiscal and regulatory 
conditions that will enable sustainable economic growth, the development of a dynamic private 
sector, the creation of jobs and raising living standards for the Iraqi people.” 
D.  Governance:  “To enable Iraqi to have a representative form of government that 
promotes the rule of law and protects the rights of all, including freedom of expression and 
religion practice, support by a vibrant civil society.  This objective will be underpinned by a 
democratically agreed constitution, a transparent electoral process and political institutions that 
do not tolerate corruption, as well as an accountable and responsive system of local 
government.” 
E.  Strategic Communication:   “To foster unity of effort among Iraqis, Coalition nations 
and the international community in achieving the above objectives.  Achievement of this goal 
will mean the Iraqi people participate in a sustained, informed, and active manner in the civic 
affairs of the country.” 
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III. Security and Law Enforcement 
The two pillars military planner insisted were necessary to conduct phase four operations were 
security and civic action.  Military planners and operators were keenly aware that to reconstruct 
Iraq we needed a secure work environment.  They understood that a strong Iraqi Military and 
Police force would be required to work with Coalition forces in order to achieve this 
environment.  The Coalition went to great measure to ensure Iraqi military units were not 
indiscriminately targeted.  Through communication efforts during the war, Coalition forces were 
able to get many of the Iraqi Army units to stand down and not engage.   As Iraqi Army units 
stood down, Coalition Force bypassed these Iraqi Army units and left them intact.  Coalition 
leaders understood the vast majority of the Iraqi military personnel were forced into service and 
had very little desire to defend Saddam Hussein.  However, the Republican Guard units were the 
acceptation and they were dealt with overwhelming force when engaged.   
During and immediately after the invasion, several events occurred which prevented use of Iraqi 
military units.  During the invasion, many of the Iraqi Army personnel abandoned their units and 
went home.  These personnel did not want to fight Coalition forces and when given the 
opportunity they left their units as quickly as possible.  Many Iraqi military units vaporized 
within days in this manner.   
Coalition military planers recognized that before they could use Iraq’s military units after the 
war, many of the top-level leaders within Iraq’s military would have to be removed or 
thoroughly vetted.  This procedure was required due to senior leaders’ strong ties with Saddam 
and the Baathe party.  Coalition planners assumed that General officers and full Colonels would 
need to be removed of vetted and officers below the rank of Lt. Col and enlisted personnel would 
be reviewed on an individual bases.  Shortly after taking office Ambassador Bremer decided to 
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dismiss the entire Iraqi Army and rebuild it from the ground up.  Dismissal of the Iraqi Army left 
Coalition forces without an Iraqi military partner.  Without a partner who understood the Iraqi 
people, terrain and culture, security immediately became more difficult than anyone anticipated.   
A result of the collapse and dismissal of the remaining Iraqi Army units was a lack of control of 
the military equipment and munitions stored through the country.  During and after the invasion 
Coalition forces found massive amounts of unsecured munitions throughout Iraq.  Without Iraqi 
troops or sufficient Coalition troops to secure the munitions, the munitions were taken. 
The initial budget to reconstitute and train the Iraq military and police force was $3.243 Billion.  
This budget assumed training and equipping nine battalions of Iraqi Army units and thirty-six 
battalions of Iraqi Civil Defense Corps.  Additionally, 35,000 police officers were to be trained, 
equipped and deployed to bring the total Iraqi police force to 85,000.    
 
IV.  Justice, Public Safety and Civil Society 
This sector was funded at $1.476 Billion for protection of judges, assisting law enforcement and 
to bring Iraq’s penal system up to international standards.  Funds up to $10 million dollars were 
made available to assist Iraqi who suffered damage as a result of the war.  Additionally this 
sectors funding was to be spent on development of political parties, promotion of democracy and 
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V. Electrical  
The electrical sector and the oil sector were identified prior to war the as critical sectors for the 
reconstruction of Iraq.  Immediately after the invasion Task Force FAJR was created by the Corp 
of Engineers to manage the electrical reconstruction.  Task force FAJR, working with USAID 
issued a contract to Bechtel in April 2003 for $1.2 billion to start reconstruction of Iraq’s 
electrical infrastructure.  This funding came from IRRF 1 funds appropriated by Congress on 12 
Apr 2003 (Iraq Electrical Report, 2005).  In November of 2003, Congress appropriated an 
additional $5.54 billion for reconstruction of the Iraq electrical infrastructure.  By allocating $6.7 
billion toward electrical reconstruction funding, Congress and the CPA looked to correct 
inherent system deficiencies and jump-start the Iraqi economy.  Additionally, the UN’s 
Developmental Funds for Iraq and other international donors contributed $3 billion towards the 
electrical reconstruction funding.  The total funding allocated towards rebuilding Iraq’s Electrical 
infrastructure was $9.75 billion (Iraq Electrical Report, 2005). However, due to inadequate 
planning, improper analysis, faulty contracting methods and insurgent activities, the availability 
of Iraqi generated electrical power today is approximately the same as it was before the war (Iraq 
Electrical Report, 2005). Like most sectors in Iraq, the electrical sector is a complex system 
affected by many variables, which the Coalition cannot control and we are just beginning to 
understand.   
 
Prior to the first Gulf War, Iraq had a capacity of 9,295 MW; however, they were only capable of 
generating approximately 3,400 MW on sustained bases.   Targeting of Iraq’s electrical system 
by coalition forces during the first Gulf war left Iraq with a sustained capacity of approximately 
2,300 MW.  Between 1991 and the Iraq invasion in 2003, Iraq was able to upgrade their output 
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to approximately 4,200 MW.  This represented only approximately 42% generating capability.  
Prior to the war in 2003, Iraq was generating 4,200 MW for an average of 13-15 hours a day.  
The majority of this power was going to Baghdad to meet Saddam’s requirement fro power 24 
hours a day (Iraq Electrical Report, 2005).   
 
Iraq’s generating capacity was substantially reduced because of their lack of maintenance, failure 
to invest in capital upgrades, UN sanctions and the use of sub-optimal fuel sources.   Iraq’s 
failure to capture and transport natural gas and to refine their crude oil products forced them to 
burn crude oil vs. natural gas or a high-grade diesel fuel.  This caused efficiency reductions of up 
to 60% in generators, greatly increasing maintenance requirements and lowering the generators 
life span.   
 
The Coalitions’ failure to recognize Iraq’s power generation practices prior to the war resulted in 
significant delays in starting the reconstruction process.  Additionally, Iraq’s electrical 
infrastructure was subject to massive looting during and after the war.  Spare parts were stolen; 
transmission lines, cables towers and transformers were stolen along with vehicles and 
equipment.  Looting of the electrical infrastructure was relatively easy and selling the component 
on the black market was lucrative.   
 
During the war, Iraq hid gasoline supplies in their natural gas pipelines.  These practices render 
many of Iraq’s natural gas lines worthless.  The pipelines were drilled by locals for the gas 
supply (common practice in the Middle East) and the liquid, vapors remaining in the lines made 
using the lines for natural gas extremely dangerous.  Failure of Iraq’s refining capability to 
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produce or separate natural gas along with their natural gas distribution system forced generating 
plants to operate with crude oil versus. natural gas.     
 
The CPA issued cost plus contracts immediately after the war to restart the electrical 
infrastructure in Iraq.  They believed the systems could be quickly restarted and issued contracts 
without fully understanding the scope of the reconstruction effort or all the requirements.  Cost 
plus contracts allowed the contracts to bill for mobilization, security and containment of base 
camp cost often without accomplishing any work due to the perceived security treat.   
Additionally, the CPA in combination with the Ministry of Interior issues contracts to repair 
facilities that had no ready access of fuel.  This lack of coordination with the CPA Oil sector and 
Minister of Oil resulted in non productive work and caused further delays in restarting the Iraq 
electrical network (Iraq Electrical Report, 2005).    
 
Prior to September 2004, the electrical reconstruction strategy focused on rebuilding the existing 
infrastructure and adding new generating capacity.  This approach was based on the following 
assumptions:  The existing electrical system was intact and could be repaired.  The Iraqi’s could 
manage and fund their own electrical system.  The Iraqi’s could meet their electrical fuel needs 
through their refineries and pipeline network.  By September 2004, the CPA realized the Iraqi 
electrical system could not operate anywhere near the installed capacity and never would with 
the equipment in place.  They found the electrical distribution system to include transmissions 
lines, substations and local networks could not handle the existing loads and the Iraqi’s were not 
capable of managing and funding their electrical system (Iraq Electrical Report, 2005).   
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Between 2003 and 2005, the Coalition was able to repair approximately 1,600 MW of existing 
generation and install 600 MW of new generation capacity.  The Iraqi government had signed 
contracts with Iran and Turkey to import 150-250 MW of energy.   While the overall electrical 
capacity has increased slightly over the past two years, the hours of available service has 
decreased due to a 37% increase in demand since the war.  Iraqi’s have purchased or acquired 
appliances such as air conditioners, TV’s, refrigerators which have driven the demand for 
electrical power significantly higher (Iraq Electrical Repot, 2005).   
 
The Iraq electric system is basically a government subsisted system.  Iraq technically has a 
billing system for businesses and homes, yet they do not have metering capacity or means of 
regulating power.  Individuals who want power simply connect to the nearest electrical line and 
wire to their home or business.  This is a dangerous process and many Iraqi’s are killed each year 
due to electrocution.  Additionally, the ability to regulate power, control demand and build a 
comprehensive, reliable electrical system in this environment is impossible.      
 
VI. Oil Infrastructure 
Iraq has the second largest known supply of oil reserves in the world (110 Billion Barrels) and 
one of the largest supplies of natural gas (100 Trillion CF) (CPA Report, 2004).  Oil provides 
95% of Iraq’s income and is absolutely critical part of Iraq’s economy.  However, neglect of the 
oil system under Saddam’s rule and difficulty in securing distribution systems has resulted in 
significant short falls in production and sale of oil.  An initial budget of $1.7 Billion dollars was 
allocated to rebuild the oil infrastructure with a goal of increasing production and income to the 
Iraqi economy.   
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Under the UN oil for food program, Iraq produced 2 million barrels per day (MBPD) and 
exported 1.3 million barrels per day in 2002.  By 2004, Iraq was producing 2.5 MBPD and 
exporting 1.65 MBPD.  This production resulted in approximately $15 billion per year in 
revenue to the Iraq economy.   In 2005, the average production capacity was 2.1 MBPD and 
exports were 1.4 MBPD.  The primary justification for the drop in production was due to 
insurgent activity particularly in northern Iraq.  Figures 11 and 12 show the results of insurgent 
attacks on pipelines and oil storage facilities in Iraq.  The northern oil fields and distribution 
pipelines running to Turkey have been heavily targeted.  The insurgent activities in these areas 
have greatly impacted the oil production.  Iraq’s oil infrastructure is outlined in Figure 13.    
 
While the oil production has fallen back to post war levels, the oil revenues have increased 
substantially due to the high oil price increase.  The Iraq budget in 2003 was $15 Billion with oil 
accounting for approximately 95% of their revenue.  In 2006, the Iraq budget is $33 Billion with 
oil accounts for 95% of the total revenue.  (Revenue estimates from oil in 2005 were $24 Billion)    
 
Oil has always been the economic backbone of Iraq and will continue to be the pre-dominate 
revenue source for the country.   Securing the oil infrastructure in Iraq is extremely difficult; 
however, without a secure production, refinery and distribution systems, Iraq oil production and 
revenue source will continue to stumble along.    




Oil Storage Facility (Northern Iraq) 
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Figure 12 
Oil Pipe Line Fire
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Figure 13  
Iraq’s Oil Infrastructure 
2207 Report to Congress 
Jan 04 
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VII.  Water Resources and Sanitation 
For a Middle Eastern country, Iraq has an amazing amount of water resources.  The country is 
feed by the Tigress and Euphrates rivers and through rain, snow fall in the northern and eastern 
provinces.  Prior to Saddam's rule, Iraq had a tremendous water infrastructure for potable water 
and for irrigation needs.  (Figure 14 shows Iraq’s water infrastructure.)  The country had a 
thriving agriculture and fishing industry.  However, under Saddam's rule, the water infrastructure 
was neglected and used for political purposes.  This neglect left many areas of the country 
without clean water to drink and divested many of Iraq’s agriculture areas.  To help correct these 
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Figure 14 
Iraq Water Infrastructure 
2207 Report to Congress 
Jan 2004
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V. III.  Transportation and Telecommunications 
This sector was provided initial funding of $500 million to repair transportation systems such as 
railways, airports, and shipping channels and ports.  Additional, funding is to be provided for the 
engineering and construction of a new telephone communication system to replace the extremely 
poor telecommunication system that was damaged during the war and afterward by looting.   
(2207, June 2003) 
 
IX. Roads, Bridges and Construction 
Initial funding for this sector was $370 million.  Funds were allocated to repair roads, bridges 
and public building throughout Iraq.  While damage to roads and public buildings during the war 
was small, Iraq’ s neglect of it’s public infrastructure and looting following the war made many 
of Iraq’s public buildings unusable.   (2207, June 2003) 
 
X.  Health Care  
Initial funding for this sector was $793 Million to repair Hospitals and health care clinics.  Iraq’s 
health care system was in a state of collapse due to neglect.  The high infant mortality rates and 
patients deaths from antiquated methods of providing care and insufficient health care supplies 
made using Iraq’s medical facilities dangerous.  Like other infrastructure in Iraq, the hospitals 




 61  
XI.  Private Sector Development 
Initial funding for this sector was $184 Million.  Funds were allocated to provide vocational 
training, open employment centers and increase public and private sector development to reduce 
the estimate 30% unemployment in Iraq.  (2207, June 2003) 
 
 
XII. Education, Refugees and Human Rights 
Initial funding for this sector was $280 Million.  This funding was provided to reenergize Iraq’s 
educational system, rebuild school and increase enrollment.  Iraq prior to Saddam’s rule had a 
good educational system with nearly universal primary school enrollment, and a substantial 
network of colleges and universities.    Funds for this sector also included promotion of human 
rights and for increasing Iraq ability to investigate past and current human rights violations. 
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 Chapter 10  
LESSONED LEARNED  
 
I.  Phase Four 
The military planning for the Iraq invasion began in late November 2001 and the invasion started 
in March 2003 (Franks, 2004).  General Franks and the CENTCOM staff went thru multiple 
integrations and reviews of the Iraq Campaign plan during this period of time to refine 
operational concepts, ensure adequate personnel, material and equipment.  During this process, 
General Franks and his staff outline four distinct phases to the campaign and identified phase 
four, post hostilities/reconstruction as the most critical phase and longest lasting phase of the Iraq 
campaign.  While General Franks clearly recognized the importance of phase four operations, it 
appears that the military did not have a phase four plan.  Rear Admiral David Nash who was in 
charge of the Iraq Reconstruction and Management Office and the Project and Contracting office 
from July 2003 to September 2004 stated that he and his staff, who were responsible for starting 
and implementing the reconstruction, were not given a plan prior to assuming responsibility or 
while they were there (Forbes, 2006).  My observations and the engineer I worked with sustain 
Admiral Nash’s point.  I cannot find any documentation of a defined reconstruction plan or phase 
four plan for Iraq.   While General Franks and his staff recognized the importance of phase four 
operations, it appears they did not conduct detailed planning for this phase.  General Frank’s 
indicates that ORHA was responsible for phase four planning and operation.  However, ORHA 
was an independent agency established by Secretary Rumsfeld that reported directly to the 
Secretary not the COCOM.  CENTCOM through Gen Franks was responsible for planning and 
execution of the Iraq campaign of which phase four was clearly identified as the most important 
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and critical phase; However, it appears the COCOM and his staff were not tasked for this phase.  
Splitting responsibility or poorly defining the lines of responsibilities for a military operation 
greatly increases the opportunity for poor execution or failure.   
 
II.  The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance 
ORHA was established to run reconstruction and humanitarian operations in Iraq after the end of 
combat operations.  However, ORHA was not provided with adequate staff, funding or direction 
to accomplish the scope of work required in Iraq.  This lack of staff, funding support and a 
poorly defined mission left ORHA unprepared to execute its mission.  ORHA failed to 
adequately research post war requirements, develop a plan for reconstruction or coordinate 
adequately with Coalition military forces.  It could be argued that ORHA never should have been 
established.  Phase four operations were identified by CENTCOM planners and should have 
remained CENTCOM’s responsibility.   
 
III.  Ambassador Bremer 
Ambassador Bremer appointment as the head of the CPA (leader in Iraq) was justified by his 
experience as a diplomat.  “ORHA’s lack of expertise in high level diplomatic negotiation and 
politics” was used as justification for replacing ORHA with Ambassador Bremer (Bremer, 
2006).  However, Ambassador Bremer was not proposed through the State Department, he was 
proposed to President Bush through the Secretary of Defense.  Additionally, Ambassador Bremer 
reported to the President through the Secretary of Defense not thru the Sectary of State.  If the 
position required a diplomat and the individual was required to function as the intern head of 
state, why was he not selected by the State Department and why did he not report through the 
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Secretary of State?  Prior to 9 May 2003, Ambassador Bremer had no involvement in the 
planning or execution of the Iraq invasion.  CENTCOM’s staff and General Franks had planned 
for over 15 months for the invasion.  Ambassador Bremer had no involvement in the planning or 
execution of the invasion nor did he have an understanding of the events taking place in Iraq 
other than what he observed on television.   If phase four operations were as critical as General 
Franks stated, why was Ambassador Bremer not involved in planning prior to the war?  Why 
was he brought in to replace an individual that had been operational less than three weeks?  
Ambassador’s Bremer’s position was that President Bush never intended ORHA’s leader, Lt. 
Gen. Garner (USA Ret), to be his permanent envoy to Iraq is likely true.  Ambassador Bremer’s 
contention that he possessed the “skills and experience necessary for that position” is 
questionable (Bremer, 2006).  Ambassador Bremer served as a State Department Staff Officer, 
Ambassador to the Netherlands and Ambassador at Large for Counter Terrorism.  He did not 
have military experience, major leadership responsibility nor experience running large 
organizations.  He did not have any experience in establishing or installing a country’s 
government or in repairing a country as devastated as Iraq.  The transition to a State Department 
led organization should have occurred.  However, this transition should have taken place after an 
Iraqi government organization was in place and after consultation with other branches of the US 
Government, Coalition partners and the UN.    
  
IV.  Infrastructure Condition 
The reconstruction requirements in Iraq were not understood or planned for prior to the invasion.  
The lack of maintenance, capital investment and poor operational practices left much of Iraq’s 
infrastructure in a state of collapse.  84% of Iraq’s people did not have a working sewage system 
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and 40% of the people did not have potable water (Forbes, 2006).  The electrical systems were 
failing and Iraq’s oil infrastructure lacked basic parts and adequate maintenance.  Alternative 
approaches to achieve the stated objectives may have been pursued if the condition of Iraq’s 
infrastructure was known prior to the war and the cost to repair it were understood by civilian 
and military planners. 
  
V.  Looting 
The extent and long-term implication of the looting that went on in Iraq after the invasion was 
not recognized or understood by Coalition forces.  Initial perceptions were the Iraqi people were 
merely taking furniture and appliances from government building as revenge; however, the 
looting went much deeper than that.   The looters destroyed almost all government buildings and 
much of Iraq’s vital infrastructure.  If the looting had been stopped immediately after the 
invasion, the US government could have saved several billion dollars in reconstruction funds and 
possible a year of reconstruction time.   The Coalition did not recognize the extent of damage 
looters were inflicting, nor did they have enough troops in Iraq to stop the looting and secure the 
government buildings. 
 
VI.  Troop Levels 
In 2002 the Army Chief of Staff testified that up to 500,000 troops would be required to provide 
security in Iraq after the invasion.  General Franks had estimated that 250,000 troops might be 
required for phase four operations.  Immediately prior to Ambassador Bremer coming to Iraq he 
discussed with President Bush an estimation by the RAND Corporation that 500,000 troops 
would be required to provide security.  The Coalition has averaged approximately 150,000 
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troops on the ground over the past three years.  This level of troop deployment is insufficient to 
maintain security throughout Iraq.   By 2005, engineers found the lack of security had 
significantly slowed down reconstruction efforts and directly increased reconstruction cost by 
20-30%.   
 
VII.  Iraq Army   
Paul Bremer was appointed as the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority on 9 May 2003.  
Within weeks after he arrived in Iraq, Mr. Bremer dissolved the Iraqi Army.  This action differed 
from the Coalition’s direction prior to and during the war and may have been one of the critical 
factors in the resulting security failure throughout the country.  During the war significant 
portions of the Iraqi Army were left intact to allow them to provide internal and external security 
for their country.  Dismissal of 400,000+ trained troops left a sizeable portion (potentially 2+ 
million Iraqi’s out of population of 26 million) of Iraq’s population without an income source 
and may have provided a well-trained pool of recruits for the insurgents.  The effect of this 
action had a divesting impact on the morale of Iraq’s people, especially career military members.   
The dismissal of the military, security forces and subsequent increase in insurgent activities 
combined with the bureaucracy and inefficiency of the CPA led reconstruction effort caused the 
rebuilding effort to slow significantly. The insurgent’s attacks on the oil, power and facility 
infrastructure appeared to have significantly slowed rebuilding effort in 2004.   
 
VIII.  Iraq Construction 
The combination of conservative government contracting officers, engineers and project 
managers along with risk adverse US construction firms resulted in a year and a half of limited 
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construction progress.  From midyear 2003 to late 2004, real construction proceeded at a slow 
pace. The failure to execute vital construction and repair projects during the eighteen months 
after the invasion lead to tremendous frustration among the Iraqi people.  The Iraqi’s frustration 
with the Coalition's inability to repair infrastructure and improve their lives a year and half after 
the invasion may have resulted in increased insurgent activities.   
  
IX. MNSTCI 
After a year of struggling to rebuild the infrastructure in Iraq and reverse the worsening security 
trend, President Bush establish the Multi National Security Transition Command Iraq (MNSTC- 
I) in May 2004.  MNSTC-I was given the mission to organize, train, equip, and mentor Iraqi 
Security Forces in order establish security within Iraq and to support Iraq's ultimate goal of a 
unified, stable and democratic country (Petreaus, 2005).  To accomplish this mission, MNSTCI 
had to recruit, train and equip a new Army, Air Force, Coast Guard, Police Force and Border 
Forces.  MNSTCI’s Engineers role in reconstructing Iraq’s security forces was to repair and 
build new recruiting centers, training bases, permanent bases, barracks and operational facilities 
throughout Iraq (Petreaus, 2005).  The construction program to stand up Iraq’s security forces 
has turned into one of the largest rebuilding effort in Iraq.  “Helping the Iraqis develop their 
capability is now seen clearly by coalition leaders as the main avenue to success in the 
accomplishment of our Coalition- including Iraqi- long term security objective” (Petreaus, 2005).  
The MNSTCI construction budget for security forces only was over $1.9B and was expected to 
grow by another $1.2B.  The overall budget for security and law enforcement in Iraq was over $5 
Billion.   (The formation of MNSTCI and high levels of funding recognized that without 
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security, the reconstruction programs would continue on indefinably and Iraq may never be able 
to form an independent and stable government)   
 
The 2003 decision to dismiss the Iraqi Military and Security Forces left the Iraqi military and 
police facilities and infrastructure open to continuous looting and to occupancy by squatters.  
MNSTCI engineers quickly found that we had to completely rebuild the security civil 
infrastructure completely.  After 2 years of occupancy and looting by Iraqis the facilities that 
Iraqi police and military used were often in such disrepair that they had to be built new or 
undergo major reconstruction to get the facilities in operational condition.    
 
The unique challenges of doing construction in Iraq combined with the national security priority 
to stand up the Iraqi security force quickly presented MNSTCI’s engineering staff with unique 
challenges.  The “Iron Triangle of Engineering where cost, schedule and quality hold equal 
importance” was not an option for MNSTCI Engineers (Petreaus, 2005).  In 2004 when 
MNSTCI was formed, standing up Iraq’s security forces quickly became the number one priority 
in Iraq.  As a result of this priority, construction quality standards went from an excellent to a 
good requirement.  Cost went from cheapest to reasonable, taking into account the execution 
time line and the poor security situation in Iraq.  “This triangle shift was a difficult issue not just 
for the engineers but also for the contracting officers who had always been trained to follow the 
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) model where quality and price (cheap) are the driving 
factors” (Petreaus, 2005).  (The FAR guidance was written for peacetime application in the US 
where security is not a cost factor and construction time requirements are not nearly as critical.)  
The state side construction and contracting habits and procedures were not only issues for 
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government employees; they were also issues for large US construction firms.  These firms were 
accustomed to working in a secure environment where they could use historical databases to 
quantify and mitigate their risk factors ensuring a profitable job.  In Iraq no such database 
existed. 
 
Within months of establishing the command, MNSTCI’s leaders and engineers recognized they 
could not accomplish their mission with the engineering and contracting procedure used to date 
in Iraq.  Early MNSTCI projects, which were given to the Corps of Engineers and the Project 
Contracting Office (PCO) for execution, were still being studied or scoped six months later.  
Realizing the impact of this logjam, MNSTCI leaders increased their engineering staff from 
seven engineers to thirty-one and brought in contracting agencies such as Air Force Center for 
Environmental Excellence (AFCEE).  These agencies brought over their staff and their 
contractors and set up offices within the command.  Using Indefinite Delivery Indefinite 
Quantity (IDIQ) contracts, these agencies executed task orders within a week of receiving the 
funds and generally had construction started within two to three weeks of issuing the task order.  
This was dramatically different from previous construction procedures where a project would 
take one to two years to go from requirement identification to completion  (Petreaus, 2005).     
 
X.  AFCEE 
AFCEE success stemmed from using small to medium size engineering and contract 
management companies.  These companies were eager to work and prove to the US Government 
that they could execute engineering and construction projects worldwide.  (PCO and Joint 
Contracting office generally used large US corporations, which demonstrated little flexibility or 
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capability to accomplish the work quickly)   This method is now being applied in other sectors as 
sector managers realize their projects are stagnating while funds are being consumed by excess 
overhead and security cost. 
 
Typically MNSTCI and AFCEE projects were executed by the following procedure:  The 
MNSTCI, Coalition Civilian Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT) or Coalition Military 
Assistance Training Team (CMATT) staffs would identify a requirement to build or reconstruct 
a new base, police station, border outpost etc.  Senior leadership within MNSTCI would approve 
the requirement.  MNSTCI funds would be identified and a military engineer would be assigned 
to the projects.  The military engineer would survey the site, often with the contractor, develop 
the engineering Scope of Work (SOW) and work with the Contracting Officers Representative to 
define, negotiate and write the Task Order.  This information would then be relayed back to the 
agency’s Contracting Officer (CO) in the states where the final task order would be negotiated 
and signed.  Often this process was complete within one to two weeks of project approval.  
Occasionally, travel difficulties slowed the process; however, with aggressive use of government 
transportation and Private Security Detail (PSD) teams, the travel rarely became an issue.  Often 
this overall process occurred within two to four weeks.  Sometimes requirements were identified, 
approved and contracted within the same week.    
 Due to the critical time requirements for MNSTCI projects, they were often started within days 
of task order award and completed within months versus the year or more for a normal Iraqi 
project.   (We awarded and oversaw a $38M construction project to design and build a new 
training base and provide beneficial occupancy for 1800 personnel within four months.)    
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To ensure quick execution, the contractors established local relationships throughout the country 
and used local labor almost exclusively to complete the work.  (Iraq is composed of several 
tribes and establishment of personnel relationships with tribal leaders was essential to 
accomplishing work within that tribe’s borders.)   Construction methods were sometimes basic 
and always labor intensive due to the large number of unskilled workers.  Construction work that 
in the west would be accomplished using heavy construction equipment, bulldozers, graders etc, 
and minimal labor was usually accomplished by hand.  It was not uncommon to see 300-700+ 
laborers working at a site.  Heavy construction equipment was not plentiful within Iraq; however, 
if the schedule required this equipment it would show up on the job site with operator, 
accomplish the task and disappear.  (There was a brisk movement of material and equipment 
across Iraq’s borders to meet the unprecedented construction demand.)   Figures 15-20 show 









Al Kut, Combined Academy (Large Manual Labor Pool) 
 (Traditional brick construction) 
 
 




Al Kut, Combined Academy (Typical Masonry Construction) 
 




Al Kut, Combined Academy (Use of Light Equipment)




Security and Justice (Academy Construction) 




Security and Justice Academy Construction  
(Basic Construction Methods)




Security and Justice (Academy Construction, Labor) 
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US contractors always provided contract management.  Usually the contractors provided two to 
six onsite managers with interpreters, who would schedule the project, coordinate with the Iraqi 
labor leaders, material suppliers and provide quality control for the project.  These Construction 
Managers (CM) were invaluable to ensuring the project was completed on time and within an 
acceptable quality standard.  These CM worked fourteen to fifteen hour days; seven days a week 
and were paid a premium salary.   The majority of the time these CM delivered their projects 
within our financial, time and quality requirements and where well worth their pay.   
Due to the critical requirements to complete construction or renovation projects for Iraq’s 
Security Force, MNSTCI and the Iraqis often took beneficial occupancy of the facilities at the 
70%-80% completion level.  This required the contractors to complete the work with Iraqi 
security forces living and working in the facilities.  While this was not ideal, our requirement to 
train, equip and house Iraqi Forces required us to follow this path.  Often this delayed final 
completion of the project; however, the mission requirements were met and we achieved the 
desired construction performance.  (Figure 21 shows a completed Border Fort) 
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Figure 21  
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XI.  Project Example 
In late February, I was directed to construct an 800 man Department of Border Enforcement 
(DBE) Academy in Basrah and to have it operational by July.  (The DBE is responsible for all 
border and port security in Iraq)  We had an existing DBE Academy in Basrah training 
approximately 150 students and we had a contract to enlarge it to a 300-person academy.  
However when we surveyed the site in early March, we discovered the existing academy 
location could not support an 800-man academy and the existing site was in an area that we 
could not secure.  (The site was located in a port area with a recruiting center in front of it which 
had been attacked several times).  We looked at a proposed site outside of town, which we had a 
contract on to build a Police Academy.  This site had 138 acres available with minimal existing 
infrastructure.   
We decided to build a combined DBE, Police and Public Order Battalion on the site.  We 
discussed requirements and cost with our contractors and Contracting Officer Representative and 
agreed upon a general scope and cost for the project.  Within a week of the site survey the 
Contracting Officer issued a notice to start work and construction started before the end of the 
month.  We spent the next several months reviewing design and cost issues which at times 
became difficult; however when I left in June the project was on schedule, budget and we 
anticipated meeting the Beneficial Occupancy date required.  (Figure 22 shows initial 
construction of the joint academy.  Figures 23-27 show typical Iraqi constructions methods and 
material)    
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Figure 22 
Initial Construction  
Joint Border Enforcement and Police Academy  
 
   




Security and Justice (Academy Construction, Building Material) 




Security and Justice (Academy Construction Types) 




Security and Justice (Academy Construction, Finishing) 






Security and Justice (Academy Construction, Typical Roof) 
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XII.  Current Direction 
Building on the success of MNSTCI, the Coalition has moved away from executing large 
projects with large US Corporations towards working with Iraqi government officials and local 
contractors on smaller projects.  This has allowed for quicker project execution, lower cost and 
increased credibility of government officials. 
The Coalition now recognizes the importance of local customs and traditions in executing 
reconstruction projects.  Initial efforts centered on Western style construction where bids were 
requested and contractors were brought in from outside of the region or province to work.  
Sometimes workers were brought in from other countries to work.  These methods completely 
ignored local and tribal leaders, customs, territories and traditional methods of conducting 
business.  The Coalition's shift towards working with local leaders and focusing on meeting their 
local needs has allowed construction to proceed much quicker with less loss of life and often at 
less cost.  Additionally, allowing Iraqis input on which projects should be completed, how the 
projects should be constructed and by who, has given Iraqi pride in ownership and moved many 
projects through that may otherwise have been delayed due to security and logistic concerns. 
Based on lessons learned from the Iraq and Afghanistan, the DOD has recognized that having the 
ability to foster stability and reconstruction should be one of its core missions.  The State 
Department in 2004 created the Office of Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization with 
many of the new offices staff coming from the DOD, CIA and other government agencies.  
These efforts by US government agencies are in response to the difficulties the US has had in 
post-conflict repair and reconstruction.  





I.  History 
The Iraqi reconstruction is the largest reconstruction effort since the European Recovery Act 
(Marshal Plan) with over $18B provided by the US government and $2.7B provided by 
international donors through the summer of 2005 (Petreaus, 2005).  Without question the US and 
our Coalition partners have made mistakes in executing the Iraqi reconstruction program.  
Failure by intelligence analysts, engineers and senior leaders to recognize the poor condition of 
the Iraq’s civil infrastructure prior to and after the war delayed adequate reconstruction funding 
and staffing levels for a year.  Failure to establish, adequately staff and fund a phase four 
reconstruction staff at least a year prior to war and requiring that staff to produce and coordinate 
a realistic reconstruction plan was a mistake.  Ignoring experienced military and civilian analysts 
recommendations on troop levels required to maintain security complicated reconstruction 
efforts, increased reconstruction cost by 20-30% and delayed implementation of democratic 
reforms.  Replacing ORHA leader and limited staff three weeks into phase four operations 
caused major confusion, resentment and reconstruction delays.  The decision to dismiss the Iraqi 
military, police force and Iraq’s government leaders created confusion and resentment among the 
Iraqi people.  Awarding cost plus contracts to large bureaucratic US corporations delayed 
implementation of reconstruction projects and significantly increased the cost of rebuilding Iraq.  
Contracting Officers and Engineers trying to apply stateside contracting and constructing 
protocol within a hostile combat environment proved a failure.  Ignoring local customs, tribal 
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leaders and traditions caused resentment among Iraqi leaders and people and wasted valuable 
time.  These mistakes are serious and have significantly damaged our reputation within Iraq, the 
Middle East and through-out the world.  These mistakes prolonged reconstruction time, limited 
the success of reconstruction efforts and may have increased the length of time and number of 
combat troops required to maintain security within Iraq.  
 
II.  Path Forward 
While we continue to make mistakes in rebuilding Iraq, the model developed by MNSTCI and 
adapted by the CPA where requirements are identified, funded, sourced and executed using local 
labor and standards is enabling Coalition forces to complete work within months versus years.  
This model is providing the Iraqi Security Forces with training and operational bases that will 
allow them to meet the security requirements of their country.   Additionally, MNSTCI’s 
execution success is putting tremendous pressure on other government agencies and their 
contractors to execute.  Contractors taking six months to study a task or a year to execute are 
being evaluated closely to determine if they bring any value to the reconstruction process.      
 
The last three years have demonstrated the difficulties the Coalition forces have in stopping the 
insurgents through the use of limited military force and that we have not done enough to win the 
Iraqi people’s trust.  The Coalition’s effort to establish and support an independent and 
democratic Iraqi government capable of managing and securing their people is the correct course 
of action. By establishing and assisting the Iraqi security forces to maintain reasonable security 
within Iraq, we will enable our contractors and the Iraqi people to repair and improve their civil 
infrastructure and rebuild their economy.  
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The conclusions derived from this research were the following:  (1) there was insufficient phase 
four planning, (2) the phase four chain of command was broken, (3) the security failed due to 
insufficient troop levels, (4) planners failed to research and plan for Iraq’s failed infrastructure 
(5) Senior military leaders and analyst concerns were ignored.  There are however, many 
successes in the reconstruction process and through applying lessons learned the Coalition is 
completing the mission of rebuilding Iraq.  Iraq has a tremendous amount of natural resources, 
the people have a will to move forward and take control of their own destiny.  If the Iraqi people 
assume control of their country, maintain security and stop the insurgent activity they will see 
dramatic improvements in their lives.   Iraq has great potential to become the model for a stable 
and democratic Middle Eastern government.  However, this process will take years to complete 
and Coalition experts including engineers will be required during and after this process to ensure 
the Iraqi people’s basic needs are met, the economy is allowed to grow and to ensure a 
democratic and independent government remains stable. 
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Tables 7  
2004 IRRF Spending Categories (A) 
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Table 8  
2004 IRRF Spending Categories (B) 
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Table 9  
2004 IRRF Spending Categories (C) 
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Table 10  
2004 IRRF Spending Categories (D) 
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Table 11  
2006 IRRF Spending Categories (A) 
2207 Report to Congress 
Jan 2006 
 




 96  
 
Table 12  
2006 IRRF Spending Categories (B) 
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Table 13  
2006 IRRF Spending Categories (C) 
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